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WHATEVER
happened to
THE DEBT?
Paul Keating's One Nation made a clear break with some 
of the economic orthodoxies of the 1980s. In the process, 
however, it contrived to write out of the picture our 
national obsession of the 80s: the national debt. Here 
Trevor Stegman argues the debt problem hasn't gone 
away: if anything it's got more pressing. And below 
Greg Mahony and David Burchell insist that the politics 
of austerity isn't going to go away, either.
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Externally 
Yours
aul Keating's February One Nation 
statement represented a significant 
change of vision in the government's 
conduct of macroeconomic policy. It 
recognised both the need for a fiscal stimulus (by 
increased government spending) to a stagnant 
economy with an unacceptably high level of un­
employment, and the importance of public in­
frastructure and social investment in providing 
enhanced national productive capacity. The 
statement's most startling feature, however, was 
the absence of any significant initiatives specifi­
cally directed at that problem which, for the last 
decade, has been Australia's chief policy preoc­
cupation—the external constraint on domestic 
economic growth. One Nation's failure to attack 
this issue adequately, or even to acknowledge the 
failure of past policy strategies, highlights its 
inadequacy as a blueprint for future policy direc­
tions.
There seems no reason for disagreement about the general 
nature of Australia's external constraint problem. We 
spend about 17-18% of the national income generated by 
domestic production (GDP) on imports of goods and ser­
vices. This percentage has remained remarkably stable 
over the boom and bust cycles of the 1980s and early 1990s. 
The level of expenditure on imports rises (and falls) with 
the level of GDP, not just because, with higher national 
income, households spend more on imported consumer 
goods, but also because higher productive activity implies 
higher imports of capital equipment.
Since increases in GDP inevitably result in increases in 
expenditure on imports, unless there is an adequate con­
tribution to the increase in production from export growth, 
strong GDP growth will lead to a deterioration in the 
balance of payments on current account. Thus the ability 
of the Australian economy to generate the GDP growth 
necessary for increased employment and living standards 
is constrained by our export performance. This external 
constraint, and the failure of policies to deal with it, have
provided the main problem for the Labor government since 
it was first elected in 1983.
In the first years of the Labor government (from 1983 to 
1985) the combination of expansionary, pro-growth fiscal 
policy, and a wages policy based around the Accord had 
demonstrated an ability to generate GDP and employment 
growth without an accompanying surge in inflation. How­
ever, the deteriorating current account position and the 
consequent increases in external debt meant that by 1985 
there was perceived to be an urgent need for policy to ease 
the external constraint. There was at the time general agree­
ment about the requirements necessary for easing this 
external constraint a restructuring of the composition of 
aggregate production of goods and services in favour of 
production for increased and new export markets and 
(more controversially) some import replacement. Without 
restructuring we would be left reliant on a narrow range of 
commodity-based exports, the markets for which are sub­
ject to short term volatility and poor longer term prospects. 
The alternative to restructuring is a policy of restriction: 
tailoring GDP growth to the performance of existing export 
markets. Or, put more bluntly, a policy of subordinating 
domestic economic growth to the economic fortunes of our 
trading partners.
The policy strategy to achieve this restructuring was to 
allow a substantial depreciation in the value of the $A in 
1985, to ensure through supportive wages policy that this 
was translated into increased international competitive­
ness for Australian industry, and to rely on the increased 
competitiveness to provide the incentive for restructuring.
While a degree of industry-govemment co-operative plan­
ning remained in some areas (eg, the motor vehicle and 
steel industries), the thrust of government strategy was to 
eschew direct involvement in the redirection of resources 
and to provide a 'level playing field' on which to allow 
market forces to provide the reallocative signals. In line 
with this strategy the government began the move away 
from quotas and tailored-to-measure tariff protection and 
toward the removal of industry specific tax incentives and 
subsidies.
Some immediate adverse effects on the current account 
from the 1985 depreciation were expected (the 7-curve' 
phenomenon). However, continual failure of the trade ac-
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count to respond indicated the lack of capacity of 
Australian industry to exploit the opportunities of in­
creased international competitiveness. Industrial restruc­
turing requires new capital expenditure to provide the 
capacity to meet new export and import replacement op­
portunities. The prerequisite for a restructuring of produc­
tive capacity is therefore not only an adequate level of 
overall investment expenditure but also a shift in its com­
position between different sectors in the economy toward 
investment in those sectors with new export and import- 
replacement potential. If Australia is to change the struc­
ture of its production the first thing we should see is a 
change in the pattern of its investment expenditure.
In the budget speeches of 1987 and 1988 then Treasurer 
Paul Keating asserted that this structural shift in the com­
position of investments was in fact taking place, with a shift 
towards the "traded goods sector'' (defined by Treasury as 
mining and manufacturing). However, a more detailed 
analysis of the sectoral composition of Australian invest­
ment expenditure, undertaken at The Centre for Applied 
Economic Research at the University of New South Wales, 
concluded that by the end of 1988 there had been no 
significant changes in the sectoral composition of ag­
gregate investment as a result of the currency depreciation. 
The results of this study suggested that the "restructuring 
through currency depreciation" strategy had failed. The 
government's retreat in 1989 to a policy of restriction of the 
level of economic activity with tight fiscal policy and high 
interest rates appeared to constitute a tacit admission of 
this failure. Rather than an explicit acknowledgment, how­
ever, policy statements from 1989 presented a different 
perspective on the current account problem, to justify the 
"recession we had to have". Rather than a structural prob­
lem (too high a proportion of aggregate expenditure on 
imports and too low a proportion of aggregate production 
devoted to exports), the current account deficit was now 
simply represented in policy statements as the excess of 
total spending over total domestic production. The cure 
was to be simply public expenditure restraint.
It should be evident that a policy of restricting the level of 
economic activity (like the tourniquet for the bleeding 
limb) provides no long term solution to the balance of 
payments problem—however necessary it might be in the 
short run. It is a dangerous oversimplification to see 
Australia's current account problem as merely the excess 
of domestic expenditure over production or, in conse­
quence, as capable of correction through the restriction of 
domestic expenditure. As expenditure in general is 
reduced through tight fiscal and monetary policy, so is 
domestic production. The trade balance only improves to 
the extent that lower levels of economic growth (or even 
negative growth) mean lower imports for a given level of 
exports. Since restricting the amount of domestic expendi­
ture does not directly increase exports, nor change the 
composition of expenditure between imports and domes­
tically produced goods, it only allows a cyclical improve­
ment in the trade balance. It comes at the cost of increased 
unemployment. And as economic growth and employ­
ment recover, the current account problem will re-emerge.
There are two additional reasons why the restrictive 
policies of 1989 and 1990 could provide no real solution to 
Australia's current account problem. Firstly, the use of high 
interest rates to restrict expenditure is likely to be harmful 
to export industries by raising their costs and tending to 
push the exchange rate up. Secondly, by far the biggest 
debit item on the current account is the interest payments 
to service foreign debts—the accumulated result of past 
current account deficits. In view of the nature of Australia's 
current account deficit and the substantial contribution of 
debt-servicing payments, clearly the solution lies not in a 
recession-induced fall in import demand, but in a stronger 
and more diversified export performance.
The recession of late 1990 deepened over 1991 and was still 
at its trough in early 1992. The One Nation statement was a 
correct, if belated, shift in policy priority to employment 
growth in this dire situation. The awful arithmetic of 
labour force, employment and output growth rates means 
that the economy must grow by approximately 3% p.a. just 
to keep the unemployment rate from increasing. A fall in 
the unemployment rate will require a faster rate of growth.
The crucial question for the government's recovery 
strategy remains; can Australia afford this rate of GDP 
growth without a deterioration in the current account and 
unsustainable or undesirable increases in foreign debt 
levels? We could not afford economic growth rates of a 
level sufficient to reduce unemployment over the 1980s 
and 1990s. What then has changed with regard to our 
export markets or the domestic economy to ease the exter­
nal constraint?
Momentous events in Europe, South Africa and Asia, and 
in US international relations make prediction about future 
international trade patterns and therefore Australia's ex­
port performance, at best, uncertain. Our capacity for 
growth then depends on the extent to which we are now 
in a better structural position to cope with the uncertainties 
of the world economy.
To the limited extent that One Nation addresses these ques­
tions, it is surprisingly sanguine and unconvincingly op­
timistic
One Nation points to some shift in the pattern of exports. A 
higher proportion of exports, it is assumed, will go to 
Asia—a region whose future growth prospects are ex­
pected to be better than for Europe and the US. The state­
ment also emphasises what in reality is an extremely small 
increase in non-commodity exports (an increase from 29% 
to 31% of total exports over the last decade) as evidence of 
structural adjustment.
There have been some suggestions that, in response to the 
collapse in domestic demand, some manufacturers have 
shifted products overseas at 'dumped' prices. If this is the 
case, these manufacturing exports are likely to fall again 
with a recovery in domestic demand. On this point it is 
ironic that the only two significant manufacturing in­
dustries with long term export strategies are the motor 
vehicle industry and the steel industry—the two industries
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where there has been some go vemment-industry co-opera- 
tive planning.
While Paul Keating appears to want to believe that there 
must have been some gain from the pain of the recession, 
a more realistic view would find no reason to conclude that 
we are better off structurally now than we were in 1989. 
Indeed, since the recession has brought a dramatic collapse 
in investment expenditure on plant and equipment, one 
might suspect that we are worse off.
The recovery strategy does include some initiatives aimed 
at stimulating the level of private investment: more 
generous depreciation allowances and improved access to 
finance for certain types of investment expenditure. The 
latter proposal betokens some small hint of a more targeted 
approach, since the criteria include industry efficiency 
standards (the absence of tariff protection, efficient work 
practices). However, there is no attempt to provide specific 
incentives for investment in, or even to identify, particular 
industries whose development can provide an improved 
basis for economic growth by easing the external con­
straint. The argument that governments cannot pick win­
ners, and that structural adjustment must be left to market 
forces, dies hard, especially in the light of the examples 
provided by the recent debacles of several state govern­
ments. Nevertheless, the high levels of private investment 
expenditure of the late 1980s, the direction of which was
driven by market forces, did not flow into areas which 
might have improved the structure of the Australian 
economy.
Without an easing of the external constraint, we are con­
demned to more of the stop-go policies of the last decade. 
The One Nation document's illustrative 'scenarios' concede 
that the forecast 4.75% GDP growth for 1992-93 will entail 
a deterioration in the current account—yet, according to the 
'scenario' the current account magically improves down 
the track even though strong economic growth continues. 
A more likely scenario if the projected growth rates are 
achieved is a continuing deterioration in the current ac­
count—a deterioration which will require the reapplying 
of the monetary and fiscal brakes.
There is evidence of some breakout in official thinking 
about economic policy in Australia, from the sterile and 
narrow prejudices of recent years. For those who see ad­
vantages in a more active role for the federal government 
in the structural development of the Australian economy, 
and the scope for increased go vemment-industry co-opera­
tive planning, One Nation was certainly a step in the right 
direction—but without some attention to the fundamental 
structural problems, it will not be nearly enough.
TREVOR S TEG MAN teaches in economics at the University 
of NSW.
The logic of 
austerity
here is a story about in Left-of-centre 
politics which goes something like 
this. In the 1980s public policy was 
dominated by the set of ideas con­
ventionally summed up in shorthand fashion as 
'economic rationalism'—meaning, variously, a 
belief in the superior allocative skills of 'free' 
markets over governments, or an irrational 
prejudice in favour of the private as against the 
public sector or, again, a belief in the need for 
government spending to be continually cur­
tailed. As a result the public sector, in relative 
terms, contracted, welfare became more closely 
targeted, and public infrastructure ran down.
Over the last few months, however, so the argument runs, 
there has been a seachange in the public debate—one 
marked, ironically, by Paul Keatings accession to the 
prime ministership. The One Nation statement is some­
times taken as the token of this seachange. According to 
this argument, One Nation marks a vital point of departure 
from the orthodoxies of the 80s. It revives the idea of public 
spending as an antidote to economic slump; it places new 
importance on infrastructure spending; it hints at new
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